In a de­vel­op­ment that could have a se­ri­ous detri­men­tal im­pact on the Indo-Pa­cific strat­egy of the US and In­dia, China is open­ing land routes to reach the Bay of Ben­gal and Ara­bian sea. Land routes in Myan­mar and Kabul are far-reach­ing steps. Em­i­nent po­lit­i­cal an­a­lyst Ku­mar San­jay Singh fore­sees the pos­si­ble dras­tic geopo­lit­i­cal im­pact of these ma­noeu­vrings, in the Bay of Ben­gal.

IN MYAN­MAR, CHINA HAS OPENED A RAIL LINE, that stretches from Chengdu, the cap­i­tal of Sichuan Province, to Lin­cang, a pre­fec­ture-level city in Chi­na’s Yun­nan province op­po­site Chin Shwe Haw, a bor­der trade town in Myan­mar’s north­east­ern Shan State.

The rail line will en­able China to trans-ship cargo from Sin­ga­pore Port via Myan­mar. Cargo will be shipped from Sin­ga­pore Port to Yan­gon Port. From there it will be trans­ported to Chin Shwe Haw in the Kokang Self-Ad­min­is­tered Zone by road, and then by rail from Lin­cang to Chengdu. The route is the first to link West­ern China with the In­dian Ocean.  This will sig­nif­i­cantly re­duce the time needed to im­port cargo to land­locked Yun­nan Province. The route will go through Man­dalay, Lashio and Hsenwi on the Myan­mar side.

For In­dia, these de­vel­op­ments ac­quire a greater sig­nif­i­cance since, with di­rect ac­cess to the Bay of Ben­gal and the Ara­bian sea, Chi­nese at­tempts to en­cir­cle In­dia ac­quires an un­prece­dented po­tency. 

Chi­na’s in­ten­tion to make in­roads into the Bay of Ben­gal which be­came clearer with Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping’s re­cent visit to Myan­mar on 17 and 18 Jan­u­ary 2020, has the po­ten­tial to dras­ti­cally al­ter re­gional geopol­i­tics in the Bay of Ben­gal. 

Kabul has be­gun con­struc­tion of a $5 mil­lion road in the Pamir moun­tain­ous re­gion to con­nect with China through a land route for the first time. The pro­ject that was started un­der the now-ousted regime has not been im­pacted ad­versely by the regime change. Even the Tal­iban lead­er­ship wishes for a speedy con­clu­sion of the pro­ject. Its com­ple­tion will en­able Bei­jing’s de­sign to in­vest in Afghanistan. The road will al­low Bei­jing to ex­port raw ma­te­ri­als from un­tapped Afghan mines for its in­creas­ing do­mes­tic con­sump­tion.

The di­rect land route to Afghanistan will be a de­ci­sive step for ini­ti­at­ing the Belt and Road Ini­tia­tive in Afghanistan. To­gether with ports in Gwadar and Dji­bouti, BRI in Afghanistan will pro­vide sig­nif­i­cant strate­gic ac­cess to China in the Ara­bian sea.

These de­vel­op­ments are de­signed to achieve two strate­gic ob­jec­tives. First, these are sig­nif­i­cant steps to­wards achiev­ing Chi­na’s string of pearl strat­egy. By con­sol­i­dat­ing its po­si­tion in the Bay of Ben­gal and Ara­bian sea, China would be able to mon­i­tor the In­dian Ocean from a po­si­tion of strength.

Sec­ondly, ac­cess to the Bay of Ben­gal and Ara­bian sea through land route will side­step the Indo-US strat­egy of keep­ing the Indo-Pa­cific open and free from Chi­nese dom­i­na­tion, through build­ing suf­fi­cient naval de­ter­rent at the Malacca Strait–widely con­sid­ered as the in­dis­pens­able link be­tween the In­dian Ocean and South China, es­pe­cially with re­gard to in­ter­na­tional trade.

The chasm that is ex­pected to emerge be­tween Afghanistan and the West will pro­vide an op­por­tu­nity for China to step in and get en­trenched.

For In­dia, these de­vel­op­ments ac­quire a greater sig­nif­i­cance since, with di­rect ac­cess to the Bay of Ben­gal and the Ara­bian sea, Chi­nese at­tempts to en­cir­cle In­dia ac­quires an un­prece­dented po­tency. 

Against this back­drop, po­lit­i­cal de­vel­op­ments within Myan­mar and Afghanistan ac­quire a unique sig­nif­i­cance both for the US and In­dia. China has ac­quired trac­tion in Myan­mar since the coup. It needs to be re­mem­bered that un­der Aung San Suu Kyi, Myan­mar had ini­ti­ated the process to align with the West, thereby di­min­ish­ing Chi­nese dom­i­nance over Myan­mar.

These de­vel­op­ments are de­signed to achieve two strate­gic ob­jec­tives. First, these are sig­nif­i­cant steps to­wards achiev­ing Chi­na’s string of pearl strat­egy. By con­sol­i­dat­ing its po­si­tion in the Bay of Ben­gal and Ara­bian sea, China would be able to mon­i­tor the In­dian Ocean from a po­si­tion of strength.

Sim­i­larly, the over­throw of Ghani’s regime and the re­turn of the Tal­iban in Afghanistan has di­min­ished US hege­mony over Afghanistan. The chasm that is ex­pected to emerge be­tween Afghanistan and the West will pro­vide an op­por­tu­nity for China to step in and get en­trenched.

Any strat­egy to check the spread of Chi­nese in­flu­ence in the Indo-Pa­cific re­gion will be in­ad­e­quate and in­com­plete if it rests pri­mar­ily on ex­ert­ing con­trol over the Malacca Strait. Any mean­ing­ful check on Chi­nese ex­pan­sion in the Indo-Pa­cific must also in­clude processes to coun­ter­act Chi­nese hege­mony in Afghanistan and Myan­mar.